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Reputation systems are meta systems that record, aggregate and dis-
tribute information about the past behaviour of principals in an applica-
tion. Typically, these applications are large-scale open distributed systems
where principals are virtually anonymous, and (a priori) have no knowl-
edge about the trustworthiness of each other. Reputation systems serve
two primary purposes: helping principals decide whom to trust, and pro-
viding an incentive for principals to well-behave.
A logical policy-based framework for reputation systems is presented.
In the framework, principals specify policies which state precise require-
ments on the past behaviour of other principals that must be fullled in
order for interaction to take place. The framework consists of a formal
model of behaviour, based on event structures; a declarative logical lan-
guage for specifying properties of past behaviour; and ecient dynamic
algorithms for checking whether a particular behaviour satises a property
from the language. It is shown how the framework can be extended in
several ways, most notably to encompass parameterized events and quan-
tication over parameters. In an extended application, it is illustrated how
the framework can be applied for dynamic history-based access control for
safe execution of unknown and untrusted programs.
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11 Introduction
Rich opportunities for fraud exist on the Internet. Still, risky interactions like
electronic commerce, involving disclosure of private informations to semi-trusted
parties, are every-day activities in our Internet lives. It seems that in practice,
for most people, the utility of the Internet outweighs its risks. When one tries
to understand better these facts, mathematical models from economic theory
are very appealing. Online interaction can often be seen as a `repeated game'
played between selsh (semi) rational principals. Such interaction may result in
utility gains for the involved principals, but often, with interaction comes also an
associated inherent risk; a potential utility-loss. For risk-adverse principals, the
fear of loss may outweigh the expectation of gain, leading to an unwillingness
to participate. For example, one might have expected that an online auctioning
system such as eBay,\a market ripe with the possibility of large-scale fraud and
deceit" [19], would never have reached the more than one million transactions
per day that are presently processed. The liveness on eBay is often attributed to
its so-called Feedback Forum, a simple example of a reputation system. When
principals have transacted, each party may leave feedback on the eBay web-
site, consisting of a rating of `positive', `neutral' or `negative'. A principal's
aggregated rating is then visible to potential buyers or sellers before deciding
whether to interact or not. In general, reputation systems record, aggregate
and (sometimes) distribute information about the past behaviour of principals.
Hence reputation systems may serve as a trust-enabling, or perhaps, more gen-
erally, trust-informing technology. Resnick et al. argue that reputation systems
foster an incentive for principals to well-behave because of \the expectation of
reciprocity or retaliation in future interactions" [28], and reputation itself has
previously been formalized and analyzed by economists in simple game-theoretic
models, leading to similar conclusions (e.g., [6,7,20,36]); it seems that reputation
systems are well etablished, and their is usefulness generally accepted.
Many reputation systems have been proposed in the literature [15], and of-
ten the recorded behavioural information is heavily abstracted. This has the
eect that several quite dierent concrete behaviours are collapsed in to the
same \equivalence class" of recorded behaviours. For example, the eBay-rating
of `negative' may be the (subjective) result of several distinct seller behaviours:
the seller may never ship the auctioned item, the item may be in a poor condi-
tion, a certain timeliness is expected, credit cards may be overcharged because
of, say, shipping fees, etc. Dierent users will be interested in the actual mean-
ing of the rating `negative'; the concrete behaviour of the seller. There are other
examples: In the EigenTrust system [17], behavioural information is obtained
by counting the number of `satisfactory' and `unsatisfactory' interactions with a
principal. Besides lacking a precise semantics, this information has abstracted
away any notion of time, and is further reduced (by normalization) to a number
in the interval [0;1]. In the Beta reputation system [14], similar abstractions are
performed, obtaining a numerical value in [ 1;1] (with a statistical interpreta-
tion). The only non-example of such crude information abstraction (that we
are aware of) is the framework of Shmatikov and Talcott [31] which we discuss
2further in the concluding section.
Abstract representations of behavioural information have their advantages
(e.g., numerical values are often easily comparable, and require little space to
store), but clearly, information is lost in the abstraction process. For example,
in EigenTrust, value `0' may represent both\no previous interaction"and\many
unsatisfactory previous interactions"[17]. Consequently, one cannot verify exact
properties of past behaviour given only the reputation information.
In this paper, the concept of `reputation system' is to be understood very
broadly, simply meaning any system in which principals record and use infor-
mation about past behaviour of principals, when assessing the risk of future
interaction. A principal is simply an identity; it may be the identity of a human
users, a public key, a software program (e.g., an identiable instance), etc. We
present a formal framework for a class of simple reputation systems in which, as
opposed to most\traditional"systems, behavioural information is represented in
a very concrete form. The advantage of our concrete representation is that su-
cient information is present to check precise properties of past behaviour. In our
framework, such requirements on past behaviour are specied in a declarative
policy-language, and the basis for making decisions regarding future interaction
becomes the verication of a behavioural history with respect to a policy. This
enables us to dene reputation systems that provide a form of provable \secu-
rity"guarantees, intuitively, of the form: \If principal p gains access to resource
r at time t, then the past behaviour of p up until time t satises requirement
 r."
To get the avour of such requirements, we preview an example policy from
a declarative language formalized in the following sections. Edjlali et al. [9]
consider a notion of history-based access control in which unknown programs,
in the form of mobile code, are dynamically classied into equivalence classes of
programs according to their behaviour (e.g. \browser-like"or \shell-like"). This
dynamic classication falls within the scope of our very broad understanding
of reputation systems. The following is an example of a policy written in our
language, which species a property similar to that of Edjlali et al., used to
classify\browser-like"applications:







Informally, the atoms modify-file, create-subprocess, open(x) and create(x)
are events which are observable by monitoring an entity's behaviour. The latter
two are parameterized events, and the quantication \8x" ranges over the pos-
sible parameters of these. Operator F 1 means `at some point in the past,' G 1
means `always in the past,' and constructs ^ and : are conjunction and negation,
respectively. Thus, clauses :F 1(modify-file) and :F 1(create-subprocess)
require that the application has never modied a le, and has never created a





requires that whenever the application opens a le, it must previously have cre-
ated that le. For example, if the application has opened the local system-le
3"/etc/passwd" (i.e. a le which it has not created) then it cannot access the
network (a right assigned to the \browser-like" class). If, instead, the applica-
tion has previously only read les it has created, then it will be allowed network
access.
1.1 Contributions and Outline
We present a formal model of the behavioural information that principals ob-
tain in our class of reputation systems. This model is based on previous work
using event structures [37] for modelling observations [25], but our treatment
of behavioural information departs from the previous work in that we perform
(almost) no information abstraction. The event-structure model is presented in
Section 2.
We describe our formal declarative language for interaction policies. In the
framework of event structures, behavioural information is modelled as sequences
of sets of events. Such linear structures can be thought of as (nite) models of
linear temporal logic (LTL) [26]. Indeed, our basic policy language is based on
a (pure-past) variant of LTL. We give the formal syntax and semantics of our
language, and provide several examples illustrating its naturality and expres-
siveness. We are able to encode several existing approaches to history-based
access control, e.g. the Chinese Wall security policy [2] and a restricted ver-
sion of so-called `one-out-of-k' access control [9]. The formal description of our
language, as well as examples and encodings, is presented in Section 3.
An interesting new problem is how to re-evaluate policies eciently when
interaction histories change as new information becomes available. It turns
out that this problem, which can be described as dynamic model-checking, can
be solved very eciently using an algorithm adapted from that of Havelund
and Ro su, based on the technique of dynamic programming, used for runtime
verication [13]. Interestingly, although one is verifying properties of an entire
interaction history, one needs not store this complete history in order to verify
a policy: old interaction can be eciently summarized relative to the policy.
In Section 4, two dynamic algorithms for policy checking is described, analysed
and compared.
Our simple policy language can be extended to encompass policies that are
more realistic and practical (e.g., for history-based access control [1,9,11,33],
and within the traditional domain of reputation systems: peer-to-peer- and
online feedback systems [17,28]). More specically, we present two extensions.
The rst is quantication (as is used in the example policy in the introductory
section). We extend the basic language, allowing parameterized events and
quantication over the parameters. An algorithm for checking the extended
language along with complexity analyses is provided. The second extension
covers the two aspects of information sharing, and quantitative properties. We
introduce constructs that allow principals to state properties, not only of their
personally-observed behaviour, but also of the behaviour observed by others (in
the terminology of Mui et al. [22], the rst is direct and encounter driven, and
the latter, indirect and propagated). Such information sharing is characteristic
4of most existing reputation systems. Another common characteristic is focus
on conveying quantitative information. In contrast, standard temporal logic is
qualitative: it deals with concepts such as before, after, always and eventually.
We show that we can extend our language to include a range of quantitative
aspects, intuitively, operators like `almost always,' `more than N,' etc. Section
5 illustrates these two extensions, and briey discusses policy-checking for the
extended languages.
Throughout the paper, we have small examples illustrating the applicability
of our framework within the area of history-based access control. We have taken
this one step further by developing a prototype security manager for Java, based
on our logical framework. The security manager is parameterized by a policy in
our language, and monitors a Java program with respect to this policy, throwing
an exception if a violation is about to happen. In Section 6, we describe this
application of our framework to history-based access control for Java programs.
Related work is discussed in the concluding section.
2 Observations as Events
Agents in a distributed system obtain information by observing events which are
typically generated by the reception or sending of messages. The structure of
these message exchanges are given in the form of protocols known to both parties
before interaction begins. By behavioural observations, we mean observations
that the parties can make about specic runs of such protocols. These include
information about the contents of messages, diversion from protocols, failure to
receive a message within a certain time-frame, etc.
Our goal in this section, is to give precise meaning to the notion of be-
havioural observations. Note that, in the setting of large-scale distributed en-
vironments, often, a particular agent will (concurrently) be involved in several
instances of protocols; each instance generating events that are logically con-
nected. One way to model the observation of events is using a process algebra
with \state", recording input/output reactions, as is done in the calculus for
trust management, ctm [5]. Here we are not interested in modelling interac-
tion protocols in such detail, but merely assume some system responsible for
generating events.
We will use the event-structure framework of Nielsen and Krukow [25] as our
model of behavioural information. The framework is suitable for our purpose
as it provides a generic model for observations that is independent of any spe-
cic programming language. In the framework, the information that an agent
has about the behaviour of another agent p, is information about a number
of (possibly active) protocol-runs with p, represented as a sequence of sets of
events, x1x2 xn, where event-set xi represents information about the ith ini-
tiated protocol-instance. Note, in frameworks for history-based access control
(e.g., [1,9,11]), histories are always sequences of single events. Our approach
generalizes this to allow sequences of (nite) sets of events; a generalization
useful for modelling information about protocol runs in distributed systems.
5We present the event-structure framework as an abstract interface providing
two operations, new and update, which respectively records the initiation of a
new protocol run, and updates the information recorded about an older run (i.e.
updates an event-set xi). A specic implementation then uses this interface to
notify our framework about events.
2.1 The Event Structure Framework
In order to illustrate the event-structure framework, we use an example comple-
menting its formal denitions. We will use a scenario inspired by the eBay online
auction-house [8], but deliberately over-simplied to illustrate the framework.
On the eBay website, a seller starts an auction by announcing, via the web-
site, the item to be auctioned. Once the auction has started the highest bid is
always visible, and bidders can place bids. A typical auction runs for 7 days,
after which the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction. Once the auction
has ended, the typical protocol is the following. The buyer (winning bidder)
sends payment of the amount of the winning bid. When payment has been
received, the seller conrms the reception of payment, and ships the auctioned
item. Optionally, both buyer and seller may leave feedback on the eBay site,
expressing their opinion about the transaction. Feedback consist of a choice
between ratings `positive', `neutral' and `negative', and, optionally, a comment.
We will model behavioural information in the eBay scenario from the buyers
point of view. We focus on the interaction following a winning bid, i.e. the
protocol described above. After winning the auction, buyer (B) has the option
to send payment, or ignore the auction (possibly risking to upset the seller). If
B chooses to send payment, he may observe conrmation of payment, and later
the reception of the auctioned item. However, it may also be the case that B
doesn't observe the conrmation within a certain time-frame (the likely scenario
being that the seller is a fraud). At any time during this process, each party may
choose to leave feedback about the other, expressing their degree of satisfaction
with the transaction. In the following, we will model an abstraction of this
scenario where we focus on the following events: buyer pays for auction, buyer
ignores auction, buyer receives conrmation, buyer receives no conrmation
within a xed time-limit, and seller leaves positive, neutral or negative feedback
(note that we do not model the buyer leaving feedback).
The basis of the event-structure framework is the fact that the observations
about protocol runs, such as an eBay transaction, have structure. Observations
may be in conict in the sense that one observation may exclude the occurrence
of others, e.g. if the seller leaves positive feedback about the transaction, he
can not leave negative or neutral feedback. An observation may depend on
another in the sense that the rst may only occur if the second has already
occurred, e.g. the buyer cannot receive a conrmation of received payment if
he has not made a payment. Finally, if two observations are neither in conict
nor dependent, they are said to be independent, and both may occur (in any
order), e.g. feedback-events and receiving conrmation are independent. Note
that `independent' just means that the events are not in conict nor dependent
6(e.g., it does not mean that the events are independent in any statistical sense).
These relations between observations are directly reected in the denition of
an event structure. (For a general account of event structures [37], traditionally
used in semantics of concurrent languages, consult the handbook chapter of
Winskel and Nielsen [38]).
Denition 2.1 (Event Structure). An event structure is a triple ES =
(E;;#) consisting of a set E, and two binary relations on E:  and #. The
elements e 2 E are called events, and the relation #, called the conict relation,
is symmetric and irreexive. The relation  is called the (causal) dependency
relation, and partially orders E. The dependency relation satises the following
axiom, for any e 2 E:
the set dee
(def)
= fe0 2 E j e0  eg is nite.
The conict- and dependency-relations satisfy the following\transitivity"axiom
for any e;e0;e00 2 E
 
e # e0 and e0  e00
implies e # e00
Two events are independent if they are not in either of the two relations.
We use event structures to model the possible observations of a single agent
in a protocol, e.g. the event structure in Figure 1 models the events observable
by the buyer in our eBay scenario.
The two relations on event structures imply that not all subsets of events
can be observed in a protocol run. The following denition formalizes exactly
what sets of observations are observable.
Denition 2.2 (Conguration). Let ES = (E;;#) be an event structure.
We say that a subset of events x  E is a conguration if it is conict free (C.F.),
and causally closed (C.C.). That is, it satises the following two properties, for
any d;d0 2 x and e 2 E
(C.F.) d r # d0; and (C.C.) e  d ) e 2 x
Notation 2.1. CES denotes the set of congurations of ES, and C0
ES  CES
the set of nite congurations. A conguration is said to be maximal if it is
maximal in the partial order (CES;). Also, if e 2 E and x 2 CES, we write
e # x, meaning that 9e0 2 x:e # e0. Finally, for x;x0 2 CES;e 2 E, dene a
relation ! by x
e ! x0 i e 62 x and x0 = x [ feg. If y  E and x 2 CES;e 2 E
we write x 6
e ! y to mean that either y 62 CES or it is not the case that x
e ! y.
A nite conguration models information regarding a single interaction, i.e.
a single run of a protocol. A maximal conguration represents complete infor-
mation about a single interaction. In our eBay example, sets ;; fpay;positiveg
and fpay;confirm;positiveg are examples of congurations (the last congu-
ration being maximal), whereas
fpay;confirm;positive;negativeg
7and fconfirmg are non-examples.
In general, the information that one agent possesses about another will con-
sist of information about several protocol runs; the information about each
individual run being represented by a conguration in the corresponding event
structure. The concept of a local interaction history models this.
Denition 2.3 (Local Interaction History). Let ES be an event structure,
and dene a local interaction history in ES to be a sequence of nite congu-
rations, h = x1x2 xn 2 C0
ES
. The individual components xi in the history h
will be called sessions.
In our eBay example, a local interaction history could be the following:
fpay;confirm;posgfpay;confirm;neugfpayg
Here pos and neu are abbreviations for the events positive and neutral.
The example history represents that the buyer has won three auctions with
the particular seller, e.g. in the third session the buyer has (so-far) observed
only event pay.
We assume that the actual system responsible for notication of events will
use the following interface to the model.





new(h) = h;. Dene also a partial operation update : C0
ES
  E  N ! C0
ES

as follows. For any h = x1x2 xi xn 2 C0
ES
, e 2 E, i 2 N, update(h;e;i)
is undened if i 62 f1;2;:::;ng or xi
e
6! xi [ feg. Otherwise
update(h;e;i) = x1x2 (xi [ feg)xn
Remarks. The notion of time in the model is based on when sessions are
started. More precisely, in our local interaction histories, h = x1x2 xn where
xi 2 CES, the order of the sessions reects the order in which the corresponding
interaction-protocols are initiated, i.e. xi refers to the observed events in the
ith-initiated session. Dierent notions of time could just as well be considered,
e.g. if xi precedes xj in sequence h, then it means that xj was updated more
recently than xi.
Note, while the order of sessions is recorded (a local history is a sequence),
in contrast, the order of independent events within a single session is not. For
example, in our eBay scenario we have
update(update(fpayg;neutral;1);confirm;1) =
update(update(fpayg;confirm;1);neutral;1)
Hence independence of events is a choice of abstraction one may make when
designing an event-structure model (because one is not interested in the partic-
ular order of events, or because the exact recording of the order of events is not
feasible). However, note that this is not a limitation of event structures: in a
scenario where this order of events is relevant (and observable), one can always
8use a\serialized"event structure in which this order of occurrences is recorded.
A serialization of events consists of splitting the events in question into dierent
events depending on the order of occurrence, e.g., supposing in the example
one wants to record the order of pay and pos, one replaces these events with
events pay-before-pos,pos-before-pay, pay-after-pos and pos-after-pay
with the obvious causal- and conict-relations.
When applying our logic (described in the next section) to express policies for
history-based access control (HBAC), we use a special type of event structure in
which the conict relation is the maximal irreexive relation on a set E of events.
The reason is that histories in many frameworks for HBAC, are sequences of
single events for a set E. When the conict relation is maximal on E, the
congurations of the corresponding event structure are exactly singleton event-
sets, hence we obtain a useful specialization of our model, compatible with the
tradition of HBAC.
3 A Language for Policies
The reason for recording behavioural information is that it can be used to guide
future decisions about interaction. We are interested in binary decisions, e.g.,
access-control and deciding whether to interact or not. In our proposed system,
such decisions will be made according to interaction policies that specify exact
requirements on local interaction histories. For example, in the eBay scenario
from last section, the bidder may adopt a policy stating: \only bid on auctions
run by a seller which has never failed to send goods for won auctions in the
past." Notice, by the way, that users would have a hard time implementing
such a policy using the current eBay feedback forum.
In this section, we propose a declarative language which is suitable for speci-
fying interaction policies. In fact, we shall use a pure-past variant of linear-time
temporal logic, a logic introduced by Pnueli for reasoning about parallel pro-
grams [26]. Pure-past temporal logic turns out to be a natural and expressive
language for stating properties of past behaviour. Furthermore, linear-temporal-
logic models are linear Kripke-structures, which resemble our local interaction
histories. We dene a satisfaction relation j=, between such histories and poli-
cies, where judgement h j=   means that the history h satises the requirements
of policy  .
3.1 Formal Description
3.1.1 Syntax.
The syntax of the logic is parametric in an event structure ES = (E;;#).
There are constant symbols for each e 2 E (ranged over by meta-variables
e;e0;ei;:::). The syntax of our language, which we denote L(ES), is given by
the following BNF.
  ::= e j 3e j  0 ^  1 j :  j X 1  j  0 S  1
9The constructs e and 3e are both atomic propositions. In particular, 3e is not
the application of the usual modal operator 3 (with the \temporal"semantics)
to formula e. Informally, the formula e is true in a session if the event e has
been observed in that session, whereas 3e, pronounced\e is possible", is true if
event e may still occur as a future observation in that session. The operators
X 1 (`last time') and S (`since') are the usual past-time operators.
3.1.2 Semantics.
A structure for L(ES), where ES = (E;;#) is an event structure, is a non-
empty local interaction history in ES, h 2 C0
ES
+. We dene the satisfaction
relation j= between structures and policies, i.e. h j=   means that the history h
satises the requirements of policy  . We will use a variation of the semantics
in linear Kripke structures: satisfaction is dened from the end of the sequence
\towards" the beginning, i.e. h j=   i (h;jhj) j=  . To dene the semantics
of (h;i) j=  , let h = x1x2 xN 2 C0
ES
, and i 2 N. Dene (h;i) j=   by
structural induction in  .
(h;i) j= e i 1  i  N and e 2 xi
(h;i) j= 3e i 1  i  N ) e r # xi
(h;i) j=  0 ^  1 i (h;i) j=  0 and (h;i) j=  1
(h;i) j= :  i (h;i) 6j=  
(h;i) j= X 1  i i > 1 and (h;i   1) j=  
(h;i) j=  0 S  1 i 9j  i:

(h;j) j=  1 and
8k:(j < k  i ) (h;k) j=  0)

Remarks. There are two main reasons for restricting ourselves to the pure-
past fragment of temporal logic (PPLTL). Most importantly, PPLTL is an ex-
pressive and natural language for stating requirements over past behaviour, e.g.
history-based access control. Hence in our application one wants to speak about
the past, not the future. We justify this claim further by providing (natural)
encodings of several existing approaches for checking requirements of past be-
haviour (c.f. Example 3.2 and 3.3 in the next section). Secondly, although one
could add future operators to obtain a seemingly more expressive language, a
result of Laroussinie et al. quanties exactly what is lost by this restriction [21].
Their result states that LTL can be exponentially more succinct than the pure-
future fragment of LTL. It follows from the duality between the pure-future and
pure-past operators, that when restricting to nite linear Kripke structures, and
interpreting h j=   as (h;jhj) j=  , then our pure-past fragment can express any
LTL formula (up to initial equivalence), though possibly at the cost of an expo-
nential increase in the size of the formula. Another advantage of PPLTL is that,
while Sistla and Clarke proved that the model-checking problem for linear tem-
poral logic with future- and past-operators (LTL) is PSPACE-complete [32],
there are very ecient algorithms for (nite-path) model-checking pure-past
fragments of LTL, and (as we shall see in Section 4) also for the dynamic policy-
checking problem.
10Note that the logic cannot distinguish the empty structure  2 C
ES from a
structure consisting of any number of empty congurations, e.g., ;;;. More gen-
erally, one way of looking at our structures is as innite sequences x1x2 xn;;,
having only nitely many non-empty congurations.
We dene standard abbreviations using syntatic equality: false  e ^:e for
some xed e 2 E, true  :false,  0 _ 1  :(: 0 ^: 1),  0 !  1  : 0 _ 1,
F 1( )  true S  , G 1( )  :F 1(: ). Note that, F 1( ) means \formula
  is true at some time in the past," whereas G 1( ) means \  is true at all
times in the past." We also dene a non-standard abbreviation e  :3e
(pronounced `conict e' or `e is impossible').
3.2 Example Policies
To illustrate the expressive power of our language, we consider a number of
example policies.
Example 3.1 (eBay). Recall the eBay scenario from Section 2, in which a
buyer has to decide whether to bid on an electronic auction issued by a seller.
We express a policy for decision `bid', stating \only bid on auctions run by a
seller that has never failed to send goods for won auctions in the past."
 bid  :F 1(time-out)
Furthermore, the buyer might require that \the seller has never provided nega-
tive feedback in auctions where payment was made." We can express this by
 bid  :F 1(time-out) ^ G 1(negative ! ignore)
Example 3.2 (Chinese Wall). The Chinese Wall policy is an important com-
mercial security-policy [2], but has also found applications within computer sci-
ence. In particular, Edjlali et al. [9] use an instance of the Chinese Wall policy
to restrict program accesses to database relations. The Chinese Wall security-
policy deals with subjects (e.g. users) and objects (e.g. resources). The objects
are organized into datasets which, in turn, are organized in so-called conict-
of-interest classes. There is a hierarchical structure on objects, datasets and
classes, so that each object has a unique dataset which, in turn, has a unique
class. In the Chinese-Wall policy, any subject initially has freedom to access
any object. After accessing an object, the set of future accessible objects is
restricted: the subject can no longer access an object in the same conict-of-
interest class unless it is in a dataset already accessed. Non-conicting classes
may still be accessed.
We now show how our logic can encode any instance of the Chinese Wall
policy. Following the model of Brewer et al. [2], we let S denote a set of subjects,
O a set of objects, and L a labeling function L : O ! C  D, where C is a set
of conict-of-interest classes and D a set of datasets. The interpretation is that
if L(o) = (co;do) for an object o 2 O, then o is in dataset do, and this dataset
belongs to the conict-of-interest class co. The hierarchical structure on objects,
11datasets and classes amounts to requiring that for any o;o0 2 O if L(o) = (c;d)
and L(o0) = (c0;d) then c = c0. The following `simple security rule' denes
when access is granted to an object o: \either it has the same dataset as an
object already accessed by that subject, or, the object belongs to a dierent
conict-of-interest class." [2] We can encode this rule in our logic. Consider an
event structure ES = (E;;#) where the events are C [ D, with (c;c0) 2 #
for c 6= c0 2 C, (d;d0) 2 # for d 6= d0 2 D, and (c;d) 2 # if (c;d) is not in
the image of L (denoted Img(L)). We take  to be discrete. Then a maximal
conguration is a set fc;dg so that the pair (c;d) 2 Img(L), corresponding to an
object access. A history is then a sequence of object accesses. Now stating the
simple security rule as a policy is easy: to access object o with L(o) = (co;do),





In this encoding we have one policy per object o. One may argue that the
policy  o only captures Chinese Wall for a single object (o), whereas the \real"
Chinese Wall policy is a single policy stating that\for every object o, the simple
security rule applies." However, in practical terms this is inessential. Even
if there are innitely many objects, a system implementing Chinese Wall one
could easily be obtained using our policies as follows. Say that our proposed
security mechanism (intended to implement \real" Chinese Wall) gets as input
the object o and the subject s for which it has to decide access. Assuming
that our mechanism knows function L, it does the following. If object o has
never been queried before in the run of our system, the mechanism generates
\on-the-y" a new policy  o according to the scheme above; it then checks  o
with respect to the current history of s.1 If o has been queried before it simply
checks  o with respect to the history of s. Since only nitely many objects can
be accessed in any nite run, only nitely many dierent policies are generated.
Hence, the described mechanism is operationally equivalent to Chinese Wall.
Example 3.3 (Shallow One-Out-of-k). The `one-out-of-k' (OOok) access-
control policy was introduced informally by Edjlali et al. [9]. Set in the area
of access control for mobile code, the OOok scheme dynamically classies pro-
grams into equivalence classes, e.g. \browser-like applications," depending on
their past behaviour. In the following we show that, if one takes the set-based
formalization of OOok by Fong [11], we can encode all OOok policies. Since
our model is sequence-based, it is richer than Fong's shallow histories which are
sets. An encoding of Fong's OOok-model thus provides a good sanity-check as
well as a declarative means of specifying OOok policies (as opposed to the more
implementation-oriented security automata).
In Fong's model of OOok, a nite number of application classes are con-
sidered, say, 1;2;:::;k. Fong identies an application class, i, with a set of
allowed actions Ci. To encode OOok policies, we consider an event structure
ES = (E;;#) with events E being the set of all access-controlled actions. As
1This check can be done in time linear in the history of subject s.
12in the last example, we take  to be discrete, and the conict relation to be
the maximal irreexive relation, i.e. a local interaction history in ES is simply
a sequence of single events. Initially, a monitored entity (originally, a piece of
mobile code [9]) has taken no actions, and its history (which is a set in Fong's
formalization) is ;. If S is the current history, then action a 2 E is allowed
if there exists 1  i  k so that S [ fag  Ci, and the history is updated to
S [ fag. For each action a 2 E we dene a policy  a for a, expressing Fong's
requirement. Assume, without loss of generality, that the sets Cj that contain
a are named 1;2;:::;i for some i  k. We will assume that each set Cj is either
nite or co-nite.
Fix a j  i. If the set Cj is co-nite (i.e., its complement E n Cj is nite),
the following formula  a
















4 Dynamic Model Checking
The problem of verifying a policy with respect to a given observed history is
the model-checking problem: given h 2 C
+
ES and  , does h j=   hold? However,
our intended scenario requires a more dynamic view. Each entity will make
many decisions, and each decision requires a model check. Furthermore, since
the model h changes as new observations are made, it is not sucient simply
to cache the answers. This leads us to consider the following dynamic problem.
Devise an implementation of the following interface, `DMC'. DMC is initially
given an event structure ES = (E;;#) and a policy   written in the ba-
sic policy language. Interface DMC supports three operations: DMC:new(),
DMC:update(e;i), and DMC:check(). A sequence of non-`check' operations
gives rise to a local interaction history h, and we shall call this the actual his-
tory. Internally, an implementation of DMC must maintain information about
the actual history h, and operations new and update are those of Section 2,
performed on h. At any time, operation DMC:check() must return the truth
of h j=  .
In this section, we describe two implementations of interface DMC. The
rst has a cheap precomputation, but higher complexity of operations update
and new, whereas the second implementation has a higher time- and space-
complexity for its precomputation, but gains in the long run with a better
complexity of the interface operations. Both implementations are inspired by
the very ecient algorithm of Havelund and Ro su for model checking past-time
13LTL [13]. Their idea is essentially this: because of the recursive semantics,
model-checking   in (h;m), i.e. deciding (h;m) j=  , can be done easily if one
knows (1) the truth of (h;m   1) j=  j for all sub-formulas  j of  , and (2)
the truth of (h;m) j=  i for all proper sub-formulas  i of   (a sub-formula of
  is proper if it is not   itself). The truth of the atomic sub-formulas of  
in (h;m) can be computed directly from the state hm, where hm is the mth
conguration in sequence h. For example, if  3 = X 1 4 ^ e, then (h;m) j=  3
i (h;m   1) j=  4, and e 2 hm. This information needed to decide (h;m) j=  
can be stored eciently as two boolean arrays Blast and Bcur, indexed by the
sub-formulas of  , so that Blast[j] is true i (h;m 1) j=  j, and Bcur[i] is true
i (h;m) j=  i. Given array Blast and the current state hm, one then constructs
array Bcur starting from the atomic formulas (which have the largest indices),
and working in a `bottom-up' manner towards index 0, for which entry Bcur[0]
represents (h;m) j=  . We shall generalize this idea of Havelund and Ro su to
obtain an algorithm for the dynamic problem.
We need some preliminary terminology. Initially, the actual interaction his-
tory h is empty, but after some time, as observations are made, the history
can be written h = x1  x2 xM  yM+1 yM+K, consisting of a longest prex
x1 xM of maximal congurations, followed by a sux of K possibly non-
maximal congurations yM+1 yM+K, called the active sessions (since we con-
sider the longest prex, yM+1 must be non-maximal). A maximal conguration
represents complete information about a protocol-run, and has the property that
it will never change in the future, i.e. cannot be changed by operation update.
This property will be essential to our dynamic algorithms as it implies that the
maximal prex needs not be stored to check h j=   dynamically.
In the following, the number M will always refer to the size of the maximal
prex, and K to the size of the sux.
4.1 An Array-based Implementation
We describe an implementation of the DMC interface based on a data structure
DS maintaining the active sessions and a collection of boolean arrays. Under-
standing the data structure is understanding the invariant it maintains, and we
will describe this in the following.
The data structure DS has a vector, accessed by variable DS:h, storing
congurations of ES, which we denote DS:h = (y1;y2;:::;yK). Part of the
invariant is that DS:h stores only the sux of active congurations, i.e. the
actual history h can be written h = x1  x2 xM  (DS:h), where the xi are all
maximal.
Initialization. The data structure is initialized with (a representation of) an
event structure ES = (E;;#) and a policy  . We assume that the represen-
tation of the congurations of ES, x 2 CES, is so that the membership e 2 x,
conict e # x, singleton union x [ feg and maximality (i.e. is x 2 CES maxi-
mal?) can be computed in constant time. Initialization starts by enumerating
the sub-formulas of  , denoted Sub( ), such that the following property holds.
14Let there be n+1 sub-formulas of  , and let  0 =  . The sub-formula enumer-
ation  0; 1; 2;:::; n satises that if  i is a proper sub-formula of  j then
i > j.
Invariance. As mentioned, part of the invariant is that DS:h stores exactly
the active congurations of the actual history h. In particular, this means that
DS:h1 is non-maximal, since otherwise there was a larger longest prex of h.2 In
addition to DS:h, the data structure maintains a boolean array DS:Bj for each
entry yj in the vector DS:h. The boolean arrays are indexed by the sub-formulas
of   (more precisely, by the integers 0;1;:::;n, corresponding to the sub-formula
enumeration). The following invariant will be maintained: DS:Bk[j] is true i
(h;M +k) j=  j, that is, if-and-only-if the actual history h = x1 xM DS:h is
a model of sub-formula  j at time M +k. Additionally, once the longest prex
of maximal congurations becomes non-empty, we allocate a special array B0,
which maintains a \summary"of the entire maximal prex of h with respect to
 , meaning that it will satisfy the invariant: B0[j] is true i (h;M) j=  j.
Operations. The invariants above imply that the model-checking problem
h j=   can be computed simply by looking at entry 0 of array DS:BK, i.e.
DS:BK[0] is true i (h;M + K) j=  0 i h j=  . This means that operation
DS:check() can be implemented in constant time O(1). Operation DS:new
is also easy: the vector DS:h is extended by adding a new entry consisting of
the empty conguration. We must also allocate a new boolean array DS:BK+1,
which is initialized using the recursive semantics, consulting the array DS:BK,
and the current state ;. This can be done in linear time in the number of
sub-formulas of  , O(j j).
The nal and most interesting operation, is DS:update(e;i). It is assumed
as a pre-condition, that 1  i  K, and that e is not in conict with DS:hi. First
we must add event e to conguration DS:hi, i.e. DS:hi becomes DS:hi [ feg.
This is simple, but it may break the invariant. In particular, arrays DS:Bk (for
k  i) may no longer satisfy (h;M + k) j=  j () DS:Bk[j] = true. Note,
however, that for any 0  k < i, the array DS:Bk still maintains its invariant.
This is due to the fact that all (sub) formulas are pure-past, and so their truth
in h at time k does not depend on congurations later than k. In particular,
since i  1, the special array DS:B0 always maintains its invariant. This means
that we can always assume that DS:Bi 1[j] is true i (h;M + i   1) j=  j.
This information can be used to correctly ll-in array i, in time linear in j j,
using the recursive semantics. In turn, this can be used to update array i + 1,
and so forth until we have correctly updated array K, and the invariants are
restored. Finally, in the case that i = 1 and the updated session DS:h1 has
become maximal, the updated actual history h now has a larger longest prex
of maximal congurations. We must now nd the largest k  K so that for all
1  k0  k, DS:hk0 is maximal. All arrays DS:Bk0 and congurations DS:hk0 for
k0 < k may then be deallocated (conguration DS:hk may also be deallocated),
2We do not consider, here, the case where DS:h is empty.
15and the new \summarizing" array DS:B0 becomes DS:Bk. We summarize the
result of this section as a theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Array-based DMC). The array-based data structure (DS)
implements the DMC interface correctly. More specically, assume that DS is
initialized with a policy   and an event structure ES, then initialization of DS is
O(j j). At any time during execution, the complexity of the interface operations
is:
 DMC:check() is O(1).
 DMC:new() is O(j j).
 DMC:update(e;i) is O((K   i + 1)  j j) where K is the current number
of active congurations in h (h is the current actual history).
Furthermore, the space requirement of DS is O(K + jEj  jCESj).
4.2 An Automata-based Implementation
In this section, we describe an alternative implementation of the DMC interface.
The implementation uses a nite automaton to improve the dynamic complex-
ity of the algorithm at the cost of a one-time computation, constructing the
automaton.
We consider the problem of model-checking   in a history h = x1x2 xM+K
as the string-acceptance problem for an automaton, A , reading symbols from
an alphabet consisting of the nite congurations of ES. The language fh 2
C
ES j h j=  g turns out to be regular for all   in our policy language.
The states of the automaton A  will be boolean arrays of size j j, i.e. indexed
by the sub-formulas of  . Thinking slightly more abstractly about the Havelund-
Ro su algorithm, lling the array Bcur using Blast and the current conguration
x 2 CES can be seen as an automaton transition from state Blast to state Bcur
performed when reading symbol x. We need some preliminary notation.
Let us identify a boolean array B indexed by the sub-formulas of   with
a set s 2 2Sub( ), i.e. B[j] = true i  j 2 s. The recursive semantics for a
xed formula  , can be seen as an algorithm, denoted RecSem, taking as input
the array Blast 2 2Sub( ) and the current conguration x 2 CES, and giving as
output Bcur 2 2Sub( ). Furthermore, the base-case of the recursive semantics
can be seen as an algorithm taking only a conguration as input and giving
a subset s 2 2Sub( ) as output. The input-output behaviour of the recursive-
semantics algorithm is exactly the transition function of our automaton.
Denition 4.1 (Automaton A ). Let   be a formula in the pure-past policy
language L(ES), where ES is an event structure. Dene a deterministic nite
automaton A  = (S;;s0;F; ), where S = 2Sub( ) [ fs0g is the set of states,
s0 62 2Sub( ) being a special initial state, and  = CES is the alphabet. The
nal states F consist of the set fs 2 S j   2 sg, and if  j=   then the initial
state is also nal, i.e. s0 2 F i ; j=  . The transition function restricted to the
16non-initial states,   : 2   CES ! 2 , is given by the recursive semantics, i.e.
 (s;x) = RecSem(s;x) for all s 2 2Sub( );x 2 . The transition function on
the initial state,  (s0; ), is given by the base-case of the recursive semantics.
Since we have identied the empty structure  2 C
ES with the singleton
sequence ;, we take the initial state to be a nal state if-and-only-if ; j=  . The
additional accepting states are those that contain formula  .
Let ^   denote the canonical extension of function   to strings h 2 C
ES.
Lemma 4.1 (Automaton Invariant). Let h 2 C
+
ES be any non-empty history,
and  j be any sub-formula of  . Then ^  (s0;h) 6= s0 and furthermore,  j 2
^  (s0;h) if-and-only-if h j=  j.
Proof. Simple induction in h.
Theorem 4.2. L(A ) = fh 2 C
ES j h j=  g
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 4.1 and the denition of s0 and F.
In the abstract setting of automaton A , we can now give a very simple and
concise description of an alternative data structure DS
0 for implementing the
interface for dynamic model checking, DMC. The basic idea is to pre-construct
the automaton during initialization, and basically replacing the dynamic lling
of the arrays DS:Bj of DS with automaton-transitions.
Initialization. Just as with DS, the data structure DS
0 is initialized with
an event structure ES and formula  . Initialization now simply consists of
constructing the automaton A . More specically, we construct the transition-
matrix of   so that  (s;x) can be computed in time O(1) by a matrix-lookup.3
DS
0 maintains a variable DS
0:ssumm of type S (the automaton states) which is
initialized to s0. In addition to ssumm, DS
0 will store a vector of pairs DS
0:h =
[(y1;s1);(y2;s2);:::;(yK;sK)], where the yi's are congurations representing
active sessions, and the si's are corresponding automaton-states where si is the
state that A  is in after reading yi. Initially this vector is empty.
Invariance. Let h = x1x2 xM  yM+1 yM+K be the actual interaction
history, i.e. (xi)M
i=1 is the longest prex of maximal congurations. The data-
structure invariant of DS
0 is that, if DS
0:h = [(y1;s1);(y2;s2);:::;(yK;sK)]
then (y1;:::;yK) are the active congurations of h, and si is the state of
the automaton after reading the string x1x2 xM  y1 yi, when started in
state s0. The invariant regarding the special variable DS
0:ssumm is simply that
DS
0:ssumm = ^  (s0;x1x2 xM), i.e. DS
0:ssumm \summarizes"the history up to
time M with respect to formula  . Notice that the invariant is satised after
initialization.
3We choose a transition-matrix representation of   for simplicity. In practice, any repre-
sentation allowing ecient computations of  (s;x) could be used.
17Operations. Let DS
0:h = [(y1;s1);(y2;s2);:::;(yK;sK)]. Then operation
DMC:check() returns true i sK 2 F. By the invariant and Lemma 4.1 this is
equivalent to h j=  . For operation DMC:new(), extend DS
0:h with the pair
(;; (sK;;)). Finally, for operation DMC:update(e;i), add e to conguration
yi of DS
0:h, then update the table DS
0:h by starting the automaton in state si 1
(or ssumm if i = 1), and setting si :=  (si 1;yi), and then si+1 :=  (si;yi+1),
and so on until the entire table DS
0:h satises the invariant. If i = 1 and y1[feg
is maximal, we must, as in DS, recompute the largest longest prex, and we
may deallocate the corresponding part of the table DS
0:h (taking care to update
DS
0:ssumm appropriately).
Since   can be evaluated in time O(1), we get the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Automata-based DMC). The automata-based data structure
(DS
0) implements the DMC interface correctly. More specically, assume that
DS
0 is initialized with a policy   and an event structure ES = (E;;#), then
initialization of DS
0 is O(2j j  jCESj  j j). At any time during execution, the
complexity of the interface operations is:
 DMC:check() is O(1).
 DMC:new() is O(1).
 DMC:update(e;i) is O(K i+1) where K is the current number of active
congurations in h (h is the current actual history).
Furthermore, the space requirement of DS
0 is O(K + jEj  jCESj + 2j j  jCESj).
4.3 Remarks
The array-and automata-basedimplementations are very similar. The automata-
based implementation simply precomputes a matrix of transitions B
x ! B0 in-
stead of recomputing from scratch the array B0 from B and x, every time it
is needed. This reduces the complexity of operations DMC:update(e;i) and
DMC:new() by a factor of j j. The cost of this is in terms of storageand time for
pre-computation, where, in the worst case, the transition matrix is exponential
in   (of size 2j j  jCESj). One important advantage with the automata-based
implementation (besides being conceptually simpler) is that we can apply the
standard technique for constructing the minimal nite automaton equivalent to
A . We believe that, in practice, this minimization will give signicant time
and space reductions. Note that minimization can be run several times, and not
just during initialization. In particular, one could run minimization each time
state ssumm is updated in order to obtain optimizations, e.g. removing states
that are unreachable in the future.
Recall, that one might be interested in dierent notions of \time" in our
temporal logic. Consider the following. Redene update(): for h = x1 xn,
1  i  N, e 2 E, dene
update(h;e;i) = x1x2 xi 1xi+1xi+2 xN(xi [ feg)
18This denition implements the idea that xi precedes xj in sequence h if xj
was updated more recently than xi. Notice that our algorithms (as well as
complexity analyses) can be easily adapted to this time concept: the update
operation simply swaps the indexes of congurations i and N in the vector of
congurations before updating the boolean arrays (or automata-states in case
of the automata-based algorithm).
5 Language Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions of the basic policy language to include
more realistic and practical policies. The rst is parameters and quantication.
For example, consider the OOok policy for classifying\browser-like"applications
(Section 3). We could use a clause like G 1(open-f ! F 1create-f) for two
events open-f and create-f, representing respectively the opening and creation
of a le with name f. However, this only encodes the requirement that for a
xed f, le f must be created before it is opened. Ideally, one would want to








where x is a variable, and the universal quantication ranges over all possible
le-names. The rst language extension allows this sort of quantication, and
considers an accompanying notion of parameterized events.
The second language extension covers two aspects: quantitative properties
and referencing. Pure-past temporal logic is very useful for specifying qualitative
properties. For instance, in the eBay example, \the seller has never provided
negative feedback in auctions where payment was made,"is directly expressible
as G 1(negative ! ignore). However, sometimes such qualitative properties
are too strict to be useful in practice. For example, in the policy above, a single
erroneous negative feedback provided by the seller will lead to the property being
irrevocably unsatisable. For this reason, our rst extension to the usual past-
time temporal-logic is the ability to express also quantitative properties, e.g.
\in at least 98% of the previous interactions, seller has not provided negative
feedback in auctions where payment was made." The second extension is the
ability, to not only refer to the locally observed behaviour, but also to require
properties of the behaviour observed by others. As a simple example of this,
suppose that b1 and b2 are two branches of the same network of banks. When a
client c wants to obtain a loan in b1, the policy of b1 might require not only that
c's history in b1 satisfy some appropriate criteria, but also that c has always
payed his mortgage on time in his previous loans with b2. Thus we allow local
policies, like that of b1, to refer to the global behaviour of an entity.
5.1 Quantication
We introduce a notion of parameterized event structure, and proceed with an
extension of the basic policy language to include quantication over param-
19eters. A parameterized event structure is like an ordinary event structure,
but where events occur with certain parameters (e.g. open("/etc/passwd") or
open("./tmp.txt")).
5.1.1 Parameterized Event Structures
We dene parameterized event structures and an appropriate notion of cong-
uration.
Denition 5.1 (Parameterized Event Structure). A parameterized event
structure is a tuple ES = (E;;#;P;) where (E;;#) is an (ordinary) event
structure, component P, called the parameters, is a set of countable parameter
sets, P = fPe j e 2 Eg, and  : E ! P is a function, called the parameter-set
assignment.
Denition 5.2 (Conguration). Let ES = (E;;#;P;) be a parame-
terized event structure. A conguration of ES is a partial function x : E ! S
e2E (e) satisfying the following two properties. Let dom(x)  E be the set
of events on which x is dened. Then
dom(x) 2 CES
8e 2 dom(x):x(e) 2 (e)
When x is a conguration, and e 2 dom(x), then we say that e has occurred
in x. Further, when x(e) = p 2 (e), we say that e has occurred with parameter
p in x. So a conguration is a set of event occurrences, each occurred event
having exactly one parameter.
Notation 5.1. We write CES for the set of congurations of ES, and C0
ES
for the set of nite congurations of ES (a conguration x is nite of dom(x)
is nite). If x;y are two partial functions x : A ! B and y : C ! D we write
(x=y) (pronounced x over y) for the partial function (x=y) : A [ B ! C [ D
given by dom(x=y) = dom(x) [ dom(y), and for all e 2 dom(x=y) we have
(x=y)(e) = x(e) if e 2 dom(x) and otherwise (x=y)(e) = y(e). Finally we write
; for the totally undened conguration (when the meaning is clear from the
context).
Here we are not interested in the theory of parameterized event structures,
but mention only that they can be explained in terms of ordinary event struc-
tures by expanding a parameterized event e of type (e) in to a set of conicting
events f(e;p) j p 2 (e)g. However, the parameters give a convenient way of
saying that the same event can occur with dierent parameters (in dierent
runs).
Denition 5.3 (Histories). A local (interaction) history h in a parameterized
event structure ES is a nite sequence h 2 C0
ES
.










e2E (e))N ! C0
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e2E (e), and i 2 N, update(h;e;p;i) is undened if i 62 f1;2;:::;ng,
dom(xi) 6
e ! dom(xi) [ feg or p 62 (e). Otherwise
update(h;e;p;i) = x1x2 ((e 7! p)=xi)xn
Throughout the following sections, we let ES = (E;;#;P;) be a pa-
rameterized event structure, where P = fPi j i 2 Ng.
5.1.2 Quantied Policies
We extend the basic language from Section 3 to parameterized event structures,
allowing quantication over parameters.
Syntax. Let Var denote a countable set of variables (ranged over by





and metavariable p range over
S1
i=1 Pi.
The quantied policy language is given by the following BNF.
  ::= e(v) j 3e(v) j  0 ^  1 j :  j
X 1  j  0 S  1 j 8x : Pi: 
We need some terminology.
 Write fv( ) for the set of free variables in   (dened in the usual way).
 A policy of the quantied language is a closed formula.
 Let   be any formula. Say that a variable x has type Pi in   if it occurs
in a sub-formula e(x) of   and (e) = Pi.
 We use the syntactic abbreviations of Section 3, and additionally the ex-
istential quantication 9x : Pi:   :8x : Pi:: .
We impose the following static well-formedness requirement on formulas  . All
free variables have unique type, and, if x is a bound variable of type Pi in  ,
then x is bound by a quantier of the correct type (e.g., by 8x : Pi: ). Further,
for each occurrence of e(p), p is of the correct type: p 2 (e).
Semantics. A (generalized) substitution is a function  : Val !
S1
i=1 Pi so
that  is the identity on each of the parameter sets Pi. Let h = x1 xn 2 C0
ES

be a history, and i 2 N. We dene a satisfaction relation (h;i) j=   by
21structural induction on  .
(h;i) j= e(v) i 1  i  N and e 2 dom(xi) and xi(e) = (v)
(h;i) j= 3e(v) i 1  i  N ) (e r # dom(xi) and
(e 2 dom(xi) ) xi(e) = (v)))
(h;i) j=  0 ^  1 i (h;i) j=  0 and (h;i) j=  1
(h;i) j= :  i (h;i) 6j=  
(h;i) j= X 1  i i > 1 and (h;i   1) j=  
(h;i) j=  0 S  1 i 9j  i:
 
(h;j) j=  1

and
[8j < j0  i:(h;j0) j=  0]

(h;i) j= 8x : Pj:  i 8p 2 Pj:(h;i) j=((x7!p)=)  
Example 5.1 (True OOok). Recall the `one-out-of-k' policy (Example 3.3).
Edjlali et al. give, among others, the following example of an OOok policy
classifying\browser-like"applications: \allow a program to connect to a remote
site if and only if it has neither tried to open a local le that it has not created,
nor tried to modify a le it has created, nor tried to create a sub-process." Since
this example implicitly quanties over all possible les (for any le f, if the
application tries to open f then it must have previously have created f), it
cannot be expressed directly in our basic language. Note also that this policy
cannot be expressed in Fong's set-based model [11]. This follows since the above
policy essentially depends on the order in which events occur (i.e. create before
open).
Now consider a parameterized event structure with two conicting events:
create and open, each of type String (representing le-names). Consider the
following quantied policy:
G 1(8x : String:(open(x) ! F 1create(x)))
This faithfully expresses the idea of Edjlali et al. that the application\can only
open les it has previously created."
5.1.3 Model Checking the Quantied Language
We can extend the array-basedalgorithm to handle the quantied language. The
key idea is the following. Instead of having boolean arrays Bk[j], we associate
with each sub-formula  j of a formula  , a constraint Ck[j] on the free variables
of  j. The invariant will be that the sub-formula  j is true for a substitution  at
time (h;k) if-and-only-if  \satises"the constraint Ck[j], i.e., Ck[j] represents
the set of substitutions  so (h;k) j=  j.
Constraints. Fix a quantied formula   and a history h = x1x2 xn 2
C0
ES
. We assume for simplicity that all m variables of  , say vars( ) =
fy1;y2;:::;ymg, have the same type P (this restriction is inessential). Let Ph 
P denote the set of distinct parameter occurrences in h (i.e., Ph = fq 2 P j
9e 2 E9i  jhj:e 2 dom(xi) and xi(e) = qg). For a nite set V of variables, let
V denote the set of substitutions for the variables V , i.e., V = V ! P. Let
22us dene an equivalence Ph on substitutions V , by
 Ph 0 i 8x 2 V:
(
(x) = 0(x) if (x) 2 Ph
0(x) 62 Ph if (x) 62 Ph
Let 
Ph
V = V = Ph be the set of equivalence classes for Ph. Let ? 62 P
be arbitrary but xed. Note that an equivalence class [] can be uniquely
represented as a function s : V ! Ph [ f?g, i.e., by s(x) = (x) if (x) 2 Ph
and s(x) = ? otherwise. This is clearly independent of the class representative
. For the rest of this paper we shall identify 
Ph
V with V ! Ph [ f?g. The
following lemma establishes that with respect to model checking, substitutions
are only distinguished up to Ph-equivalence.
Lemma 5.1. For all quantied formulas  , all histories h, and all substitutions
;0 2 fv( )
if  Ph 0 then h j=   () h j=
0
 
Proof. Let h = x1 xn be xed, and recall Ph = fq 2 P j 9e 2 E9i  jhj:e 2
dom(xi) and xi(e) = qg. Let  Ph 0. Our proof is by structural induction in
 . For the base case we need only consider the atomic formulas of form e(x)
or 3e(x) (if   doesnt have a free variable then its truth is independent of the
substitution). If (x) 2 Ph then since  Ph 0, we have 0(x) = (x) and the
result is obvious. If (x) 62 Ph then since  Ph 0, we also have 0(x) 62 Ph.
Hence h 6j= e(x) and h 6j=
0
e(x). If e is in conict with xn or e 2 xn then
h 6j= 3e(x) and h 6j=
0
3e(x), otherwise h j= 3e(x) and h j=
0
3e(x).
For the inductive step, all cases follow trivially from the inductive hypothesis.
For example, for   = 8x : Pj:  then since h j=   () h j=
0
 , clearly
h j= 8x : Pj:  i for all p 2 Pj:h j=(x7!p)=  j i p 2 Pj:h j=(x7!p)=
0
 j
(because for any xed p 2 Pj we have (x 7! p)= Ph (x 7! p)=0).
A function c : 
Ph
V ! f>;?g is called a (V -) constraint (in h). A substitution
 2 V satises constraint c if c([]) = >. In this case we write  j= c. We write
ConstraintV for the set of V -constraints (in some xed history h which is clear
from the context), and if c : 
Ph
V ! f>;?g is a constraint, then vars(c)
(def)
= V .
Notice that when fv( ) = ; then fv( ) ' 1 (i.e., a singleton set), hence a
constraint is simply a boolean. In this sense, constraints generalize booleans.
In the array-based algorithm, sub-formula  j will be associated with a  j-
constraint Ck[j] in h, i.e., on the free variables of  j (where Ck will correspond
to time k in a history h). Notice that replacing the boolean arrays Bk[j] with
constraint arrays Ck[j] can be seen as a proper generalization of the array-based
algorithm. We generalize the (main) invariant of the algorithm from
h;k j=  j () Bk[j] = true
to
8 2 fv( j):

h;k j=
  j ()  j= Ck[j]

23Notice that for closed  j, the invariants are equivalent. It is also important
to notice that constraints can be viewed as functions taking as input an m'ary
vector of (Ph [ f?g)-values (where m is the number of variables) and giving
a boolean value as output. Hence constraints are nite objects. Notice also
that since constraints are boolean valued, it makes sense to consider logical
operators on constraints, e.g., the conjunction (c ^ c0)([]) = c([]) ^ c0([]) of
two constraints c and c0 (even if they are not on the same variables).4 For a
variable x and a parameter p 2 Ph we will use notation x 2 fpg to denote the
constraint given by (x 2 fpg)([]) = > () (x) = p. Further > and ? denote
respectively the two constant constraints.
Constructing constraints. Let h = x1 xn be a history and 1 < k  n.
Dene a translation JKk
h from the quantied language to constraints, associating
with each formula in the quantied language  , a constraint J Kk
h on the free
variables of  . The function JKk
h is dened relative to index k and history h,
and we assume (inductively) that when dening J Kk
h, we have access to J 0Kk
h
for all proper sub-formulas  0 of  , and also J 0K
k 1
h for all sub-formulas  0 of  .
In the model-checking algorithm, the constraint J jKk
h will correspond to entry
j in array Ck. Recall that the invariant we aim to maintain is the following.
8 2 fv( j):

h;k j=  j ()  j= Ck[j]






> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
y 2 fpg if v = y and e 2 dom(xk) and
xk(e) = p






> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
y 2 fpg if v = y and e 2 dom(xk) and
xk(e) = p
> if (v = p and e 2 dom(xk) and
xk(e) = p) or if
e 62 dom(xk) and e r # dom(xk)
? otherwise
We proceed inductively in  .
J 0 ^  1Kk
h = J 0Kk
h ^ J 1Kk
h
J: Kk
h = :J Kk
h
JX 1 Kk
h = J K
k 1
h
J 0 S  1Kk
h = J 1Kk
h _ (J 0 S  1K
k 1
h ^ J 0Kk
h)
J8x : P: Kk
h = elimx(J Kk
h)
4If A  B then an A-constraint can be seen as a B-constraint by imposing no additional
requirements on the extra variables.
24All the clauses are straightforward except for 8x : P: , which is handled by
auxiliary function elimx. We dene this function now. Assuming we have access
to c = J Kk
h so that  j= c () (h;k) j=  , we must produce a new constraint




8p 2 P:((x 7! p)=) j= c

(for all )
The function elimx does this; it transforms a constraint c into a constraint
c0 = elimx(c) with vars(c0) = vars(c) n fxg, satisfying the above equivalence.




c([(x 7! q)=])) ^ c((x 7! ?)=[])
Notice that we would obtain a function for existential quantication by taking
a disjunction instead of a conjunction.
Array-based Model Checking. In the light of function JK there is a
straightforward extension of data-structure DS into a similar data-structure
DS
8 for array-based dynamic model-checking of the quantied language. Struc-
ture DS
8 will maintain a history DS
8:h = x1x2 xn, and a collection of n+1
constraint-arrays DS
8:Ck[j] (for 0  k  n), each array indexed by the sub-
formulas of  . The constraint in Ck[j] will be Ck[j] = J jKh
k for k > 0 (C0 is
the special summary constraint). The invariant implies that for any closed  ,
(h;n) j=   () j= DS
8:Cn[0]
(we write j= c, and say that c is valid, if c = >). Hence operation check is
a validity check, which is easy since vars(DS
8:Cn[0]) = ; when   is closed.
Operation new is essentially as in DS (with the generalization from booleans
to constraints).
For operation update(e;p;i) there are two cases. In the rst case p 2 Ph,
and update works as usual (again generalizing to constraints). In the case where
p 62 Ph, we update history h to h0 appropriately, and thus obtain a new, larger
Ph0 = Ph[fpg. Notice that constraints in h can be easily extended to constraints
in h0: if c : 
Ph
V ! f>;?g then we can think of c as a constraint in h0 by the
following. For all  2 V , let []h0 be the Ph0-equivalence class for , and let
[]h be the Ph-equivalence class for , then
c([]P 0
h) = c([]Ph)
This means that we can use the logical operators on constraints c in the history
h and constraints c0 in the history h0, by rst extending c to a constraint in
h0, and then performing the logical operation. Hence update(e;p;i) can be
implemented as usual, except that we may need to dynamically extend some
constraints in h to constraints in h0.
Complexity. The above paragraphs show that dynamic model-checking for
the quantied language is decidable in spite of the fact that we allow quantica-
tion over innite parameter sets. This is essentially due to the fact that in any
25history, only a nite portion of the parameters can actually occur. However, we
do have the following hardness result.
Proposition 5.1 (PSPACE Hardness). Even for single element models, the
model-checking problem for the quantied policy language is PSPACE hard.
Proof. Fix a parameterized event structure ES. A quantied model-checking
(QMC) instance (for ES) consists of a history h = x1 xn and a closed formula
  of the quantied language (over ES). Say that a QMC instance (h; ) is in
QMC if h j=  . A single element model is a model, h 2 C0
ES
, with h = x,
where x 2 C0
ES.
The quantied boolean formula (QBF) problem is the problem of deciding
the truth of quantied formulas of the form
Q1x1Q2x2 Qnxn:(x1;:::;xn)
where each Qi is a quantier (8 or 9), and  is a quantier-free boolean formula
(i.e., a propositional formula) with fv()  fx1;:::;xng. The QBF problem is
known to be PSPACE complete [34]. Given a QBF f = Q1x1Q2x2 Qnxn:,
construct an MC-instance as follows. Use a parameterized event structure with
a single event ? having two possible parameters ? and >. Let h = [? 7! >] be
a single element history. Construct formula   as    Q1x1Q2x2 Qnxn: 0,
where x1;:::;xn are the variables of f, and  0 is  with each variable xj replaced
by ?(xj). Then f is satisable if-and-only-if (h;jhj) j=  .
While the general problem is PSPACE hard, we are able to obtain the fol-
lowing quantitative result which bounds the complexity of our algorithm. Sup-
pose we are to check a formula  0  Q1x1Q2x2 Qnxn: , where the Qi are
quantiers and xi variables. We can obtain a bound on the running time of
our proposed algorithm in terms of the number of quantiers n. This is of
practical relevance since many useful policies have few quantiers. Clearly the
complexity depends on the representation of constraints c : 
Ph
V ! f>;?g.
One ecient representation of constraints is using multiple-valued decision di-
agrams [16]. With this representation, constraints c can be eciently stored in
space O((jPhj + 1)n) and the logical operations can all be computed in linear
time O((jPhj + 1)n). Further a constraint in h can be extended to a constraint
in h0 = update(h;e;p;i) in linear time O((jPh0j + 1)n).
Theorem 5.1 (Complexity Bound). Let formula    Q1x1Q2x2 Qnxn: 0
where the Qi are quantiers, xi variables all of type P, and  0 is a quantier-free
formula from the quantied language with fv( 0)  fx1;:::;xng. Let h 2 C0
ES

and jPhj be the number of parameter occurrences in history h. The constraint-
based algorithm for dynamic model checking has the following complexity.
 DMC:check() is O(1).
 DMC:new() is O(j j  (jPhj + 1)n).
26 DMC:update(e;p;i) when p 2 Ph and K is the current number of active
congurations in h, is
O((K   i + 1)  j j  (jPhj + 1)n)
 DMC:update(e;p;i) when p 62 Ph and K is the current number of active
congurations in h, is
O((K   i + 1)  j j  (jPhj + 2)n)
Furthermore, the space requirement of DS
0 is O(K  (jEj + j j  (jPhj + 1)n)).
5.2 References and Quantitative Properties
In this section, we briey illustrate another way to extend the core policy-
language to a more practical one. As mentioned, we consider two aspects:
referencing and quantitative properties. For referencing we introduce a construct
p :  , where p is a principal-identity and   is a basic policy. The construct is
intended to mean that principal p's observations (about a subject) must satisfy
past-time  . For quantitative properties, we introduce a counting operator
#, used e.g. in formula p : #  which counts the number of p-observed sessions
satisfying   (we use # to avoid confusion with the conict relation, often denoted
by #).
To express referencing, we extend the basic syntax to include a new syntactic
category  (for policy). Let Prin be a collection of principal identities.
 ::= p :   j 0 ^ 1 j : p 2 Prin
The policy p :   means that the observations that p has made should satisfy
 . Note that in this extended language, models are no longer local interaction
histories, but, instead, global interaction histories, represented as a principal-
indexed collection of local histories (i.e., functions of type Prin ! C
ES).
The quantitative extension is given by extending the category  . Let (Rj)1
j=1
be a countable collection of k'ary relation-symbols for each k 2 N, representing
computable relations JRjK  Nk.
  ::= ::: j Rj(# 1;# 2;:::;# k)
The denotation of the construct #  is the number of sessions in the past
which satisfy formula  , e.g., #negativecounts the number of states in the past
satisfying negative. So the denotation of #  is a number, and the semantics
of Rj(# 1;# 2;:::;# k) is true i (n1;n2;:::;nk) 2 JRjK, where ni is the
denotation of # i. Finally, we extend also category :
 ::= ::: j Rj(p1 : # 1;:::;pk : # k) pi 2 Prin
The construct Rj(p1 : # 1;:::;pk : # k) means that, letting ni denote the
number of sessions observed by principal pi satisfying  i, then the relation JRjK
on numbers must have (n1;:::;nk) 2 JRjK.
27We do not provide a formal semantics as the meaning of our constructs should
be intuitively clear, and our purpose is simply to illustrate how the core language
can be extended to encompass more realistic policies. To further illustrate the
constructs, we consider a number of example policies. In the following examples,
p;p1;p2;:::;pn 2 Prin are principal identities.
Example 5.2 (eBay revisited). Consider the eBay scenario again. The policy
of Example 3.1 could be extended with referencing, e.g. principal p might use
policy:
bid
p  p : G 1(negative ! ignore) ^ V
q2fp;p1;:::;png q : :F 1(time-out)
Intuitively, this policy represents a requirement by principal p: \seller has never
provided negative feedback about me, regarding auctions where I made payment,
and, furthermore, seller has never cheated me or any of my friends."
Example 5.3 (P2P File-sharing). This example is inspired by the example
used in the license-based system of Shmatikov and Talcott [31]. Consider a sce-
nario where a P2P le-servent has two resources, dl (download), and ul (upload).
Suppose this is modelled by an event structure with two independent events dl
and ul, so that in each session, a peer-client either uploads, downloads or both.
We express a policy used by server p for granting download, stating that \the
number of uploads should be at least a third of the number of downloads."
client-dl
p  p : (#dl  3  #ul)
This refers only to the local history with p. Supposing we instead want to
express a more \global" policy on the behaviour, stating that globally, p has
uploaded at least a third of its downloads (e.g. locally this may be violated).
client-dl
p  (p : #dl) + (
Pn
i=1 pi : #dl) 
3  (p : #ul + (
Pn
i=1 pi : #ul))
Example 5.4 (\Probabilistic"policy). Consider an arbitraryevent structure
ES = (E;;#). We express a policy ensuring that \statistically, event ev 2 E
occurs with frequency at least 75%."
probab
p  p :
#ev




Here # ev counts the number of sessions in which ev has not occurred and
cannot occur in the future.
5.2.1 Implementation remarks.
Dynamic model checking for the extended policy language can done by extending
the array-based algorithm from the previous section. Note that the value of # 
can easily be dened in the style of the recursive semantics. To handle the
28construct R(# ), one maintains a number of integer variables which denote
the values of sub-formula #  at each active session. The integers are then
updated using the recursive semantics in a way similar to the array-updates in
Section 4. We have the following result, assuming that the relations can be
evaluated in constant time, and that numbers can be stored/manipulated in
constant space/time.
Theorem 5.2. Let formula   be from the basic language extended with the
quantitative constructs. Let h 2 C0
ES
 be a history. The dynamic model check-
ing can be implemented with the following complexity.
 DMC:check() is O(1).
 DMC:new() is O(j j).
 DMC:update(e;i) is O((K   i + 1)  j j) where K is the current number
of active congurations in h.
Note, that the automata-based algorithm does not easily extend: the (seman-
tics of the) extended language is no-longer regular, e.g. illustrated by formula
 p  p : (#dl  #ul).
The construct p :  , where p is a principal identity, requires that p's inter-
action history (with the subject in question) satises  . This is handled simply
by \sending formula  " to p. Principal p maintains the truth of   with respect
to its interaction history using the algorithms of last section, and sends the re-
quired value to the requesting principal when needed.5 Another approach is for
p to send its entire interaction history so that the verication can be performed
locally, e.g., as is done with method exportEvents in the license-based frame-
work of Shmatikov and Talcott [31]. It does not make sense to consider the
algorithmic complexity of referencing. The message complexity of referencing,
however, is linear in the number of principals to be contacted (one query and
one reply).
6 A Java Security Manager
In this section we describe an application of our logical framework to the area
of history-based access control for untrusted code. We have designed and im-
plemented a prototype Java Security Manager which is able to monitor a Java
program with respect to a\history-based"policy, written in our logic. If the se-
curity manager detects a violation of policy, a Java security exception is thrown
and the violating action is aborted. We describe briey the Java security model,
5One might argue that this leads to problems of timing: at what point in time is   then
to be evaluated? But such timing-issues are inherent in distributed systems. Formula p :   is
a relative temporal specication that is interpreted by the sender as referring to the current
history of p, when p decides to evaluate it. The sender of   thus knows that received valuation
(true or false) reects an evaluation of   with respect to some recent view of p's history.
29and proceed with a more detail description of the design and implementation of
our history-based security manager.
The Java Programming Language supports the concept of a security man-
ager: an object that supervises another Java application with respect to security
sensitive operations, e.g., le or network access.6 Java programs that run other
Java programs, e.g., a browser running a Java applet, can install a security
manager that mediates the untrusted program's security sensitive operations.
Operations, like connecting to a socket on a remote site, are performed by Java
applications via the Java API, e.g., class Socketof the java.netlibrary provides
an appropriate abstraction for \sockets." API classes make calls to the security
manager's checkPermission(java.lang.Permission) method whenever a se-
curity sensitive operation is requested, e.g., the Socket class calls checkPerms-
sion with an appropriate instance of the java.net.SocketPermission (con-
taining information about which remote site and port is being accessed). The se-
curity manager then inspects the java.lang.Permission object (possibly con-
sulting a user-specied security policy) and throws a java.lang.SecurityException
if access should not be granted.
The Java security architecture allows users to write their own security man-
agers by extending the java.lang.SecurityManager class. We have written a
security manager that decides access by checking conformance to policies from
our history-based framework. The application is a simple prototype, used only
for testing the validity of our approach to history-based access control, and
consequently, the current version supports only a small subset of the security
relevant operations available in Java.7
6.1 Design
We have designed two versions of the HBAC application, a basic and a pa-
rameterized version, corresponding to the basic and parameterized languages
described previously. The basic events in our event structure correspond to the
Java security events, e.g., java.io.FilePermissionfor representing le-access.
For simplicity, the current version supports only the events corresponding to le
and network access, corresponding to the java classes java.io.FilePermission
and java.net.SocketPermission, however it would be simple to extend this to




Note that since there are only four types of operations for each event-type (e.g.
`read' for the `FilePermission') these\nitely parameterized"events can be rep-
resented in the basic model. In the parameterized model, the parameterized
events include also information about lenames/hostnames, e.g., event Socket-
6More information about the Java security architecture, and security managers can be
found at http://java.sun.com/security/index.jsp.
7The prototype source code is available as an open-source project, hosted at SourceForge,
https://sourceforge.net/projects/javahbac.
30Permission(connect)has further string-type parameters specifying a port and
hostname, and FilePermission(read)has a parameter specifying the lename.
We have provided DSD2.0 [18,24] descriptions of XML languages for both
the basic and parameterized policies. A policy consists of a list of actions, e.g.,
java.net.SocketPermission(connect), followed by a formula from one of the
two logics. An example policy is provided in Figure 7; it describes the policy
requiring that for the application to perform the actions of connecting a socket
or accepting a socket connection, the history must satisfy the property
G
 1(8x : String:(java:lang:FilePermission(read)(x) !
F 1java:lang:FilePermission(write)(x)))
We have implemented a SAX parser which reads a policy le from the disk and
generates an internal data-structure representing the policy. This parser can be
used by an application that wishes to install a security manager implementing
a policy.
We have dened two security managers: an automata-based security man-
ager (SecMan.java) for the basic language, using the ecient Java package
dk.brics.automaton [23]; and an array-based security manager for the quan-
tied language (QSecMan.java), using the JavaBDD binary decision diagram
package for implementing constraints [35]. The input for both security man-
agers is an XML representation of a policy, and both override the method
checkPermission of the SecurityManager class to check whether a specic ac-
tion is allowed. The basic security manager uses the automata-based algorithm
from Section 4, whereas the quantied security manager uses the array-based
algorithm from the same section, but extending the booleans to the constraints
of Section 5.
We illustrate, by means of example, how one might use our security man-
agers. Consider the following Java programwhich tries to read the le "secret.txt"
and then send the contents to a location on the Internet.
import java.io.*;
import java.net.*;
public class Evil {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
System.out.println("begin");
BufferedReader buf = new BufferedReader(new FileReader("secret.txt"));
String line = null;
StringBuffer sbuf = new StringBuffer();
System.out.println("reading password");





Socket s = new Socket("www.microsoft.com",80);





Suppose we want to run this program under the above example security policy.
An application class for installing a security manager and running the program
31could be the following.
import java.util.*;
import java.security.Permission;
public class TestQSecMan {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
QPolicyParser pp = new QPolicyParser();
pp.parse(args[0]);






private static QSecMan setupSecurityManager(QPolicyParser pp) {




First, the policy is specied as an argument to the program. The program
parses the policy using our SAX parser. Then it constructs a quantied se-
curity manager object, using the setup-method (the specics are simple and
not relevant here). Once the security manager is constructed, it uses the Sys-
tem.setSecurityManager Java method, to install the monitor. After this, the
program can be run, and the security manager ensures that the policy is not
violated.
Specically, the output of running the above looks as follows.





check: (java.util.PropertyPermission user.dir read)




check: (java.util.PropertyPermission java.net.preferIPv6Addresses read)
check: (java.lang.RuntimePermission loadLibrary.net)
check: (java.io.FilePermission /home/java/Linux-jdk1.5.0_04/jre/lib/i386/libnet.so read)
check: (java.util.PropertyPermission java.net.preferIPv4Stack read)
check: (java.util.PropertyPermission impl.prefix read)
check: (java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission suppressAccessChecks)
check: (java.util.PropertyPermission sun.net.spi.nameservice.provider.1 read)
check: (java.net.SocketPermission www.microsoft.com resolve)
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.SecurityException: Execution History Exception: Neg(QSince(QTrue, Neg(QF












32We see that a security exception is thrown, not when the programs accesses the
password, but when it tries to open a socket connection. We see also that there
are a number of additional operations that are necessary for opening sockets,
e.g., (java.io.FilePermission,/home/java/Linux-jdk1.5.0_04/jre/lib/i386/
libnet.so,read).
We have not yet done further experimentation with the framework, but our
initial impression is good. Finally, we would like to compare our proposed
framework to the similar system Deeds, of Edjlali et al. [9]. The Deeds system
is similar to our prototype system in that Deeds also seeks to do history-based
access control for Java (infact, Deeds was the main source of inspiration for this
application). First, Deeds is more general than our system because \the set of
security events is not xed." In our system, the set of security-relevant events is
restricted to what Java considers security events (this may change with future
releases of Java). Secondly, Deeds is more low-level than our system: in Deeds,
the programmer explicitly must maintain the event history (performing opti-
mizations as he sees t), and the programmer explicitly programs the security
monitor (using full Java). This has the advantage that it is more exible, but
the disadvantage that such programming is error-prone, and highly security sen-
sitive. In contrast, specifying an XML policy which is automatically monitored
is less error-prone as the policy is declarative, and domain-specic. Further-
more, we're using standard algorithms that can eciently handle all policies in
the XML language, and which performs optimizations automatically, e.g., event
history maintainance (and deallocation) and automata minimization. Finally,
Deeds is much more fully developed while our approach is still at the proto-
type and evalutation level. We encourage interested readers to download the
source code at https://sourceforge.net/projects/javahbac, and develop it
further.
7 Conclusion
Our approach to reputation-systems diers from most existing systems in that
reputation information has an exact semantics, and is represented in a very con-
crete form. In our view, the novelty of our approach is that our instance systems
can veriably provide a form of exact security guarantees, albeit non-standard,
that relate a present authorization to a precise property of past behaviour. We
have presented a declarative language for specifying such security properties,
and the applications of our technique extends beyond the traditional domain of
reputations systems in that we can explain, formally, several existing approaches
to \history based"access control.
We have given two ecient algorithms for the dynamic model-checking prob-
lem, supporting the feasibility of running implementations of our framework on
devices of limited computational and storage capacity; a useful property in
global computing environments. In particular, it is noteworthy that principals
need not store their entire interaction histories, but only the so-called active
sessions.
33Related Work. Many reputation-based systems have been proposed in the
literature (Jsang et al. [15] provide many references), so we choose to mention
only a few typical examples and closely related systems. Kamvar et al. present
EigenTrust [17], Shmatikov and Talcott propose a license-based framework [31],
and the EU project `SECURE' [3,4] (which also uses event structures for mod-
elling observations) can be viewed as a reputation-based system, to name a
notable few.
The framework of Shmatikov and Talcott is the most closely related in that
they deploy also a very concrete representation of behavioural information (\evi-
dence"[31]). This representation is not as sophisticated as in the event-structure
framework (e.g., as histories are sets of time-stamped events there is no concept
of a session, i.e., a logically connected set of events), and their notion of reputa-
tion is based on an entity's past ability to fulll so-called licenses. A license is a
contract between an issuer and a licensee. Licenses are more general than inter-
action policies since they are mutual contracts between issuer and licensee, which
may permit the licensee to perform certain actions, but may also require that
certain actions are performed. The framework does not have a domain-specic
language for specifying licenses (i.e. for specifying license-methods permits and
violated), and the use of reputation information is not part of their formal
framework (i.e. it is up to each application programmer to write method useOk
for protecting a resource). We do not see our framework as competing, but,
rather, compatible with theirs. We imagine using a policy language, like ours,
as a domain-specic language for specifying licenses as well as use-policies. We
believe that because of the simplicity of our declarative policy language and its
formal semantics, this would facilitate verication and other reasoning about
instances of their framework.
Pucella and Weissman use a variant of pure-future linear temporal logic for
reasoning about licenses [27]. They are not interested in the specic details of
licenses, but merely require that licenses can be given a trace-based semantics;
in particular, their logic is illustrated for licenses that are regular languages.
As our basic policies can be seen (semantically) as regular languages (Theorem
4.2), and policies can be seen as a type of license, one could imagine using their
logic to reason about our policies.
Roger and Goubault-Larreq [29] have used linear temporal logic and associ-
ated model-checking algorithms for log auditing. The work is related although
their application is quite dierent. While their logic is rst-order in the sense of
having variables, they have no explicit quantication. Our quantied language
diers (besides being pure-past instead of pure-future) in that we allow explicit
quantication (over dierent parameter types) 8x : Pi:  and 9x : Pi: , while
their language is implicitly universally quantied.
The notion of security automata, introduced by Schneider [30], is related to
our policy language. A security automaton runs in parallel with a program, mon-
itoring its execution with respect to a security policy. If the automata detects
that the program is about to violate the policy, it terminates the program. A
policy is given in terms of an automata, and a (non-declarative) domain-specic
language for dening security automata (SAL) is supported but has been found
34awkward for policy specication [10]. One can view the nite automaton in
our automata-based algorithm as a kind of security automaton, declaratively
specied by a temporal-logic formula.
Security automata are also related, in a technical sense [11], to the notion of
history-based access control (HBAC). HBAC has been the subject of a consid-
erable amount of research (e.g., papers [1,9,11,12,30,33]). There is a distinction
between dynamic HBAC in which programs are monitored as they execute, and
terminated if about to violate policy [9,11,12,30]; and static HBAC in which
some preliminary static analysis of the program (written in a predetermined
language) extracts a safe approximation of the programs' runtime behaviour,
and then (statically) checks that this approximation will always conform to
policy (using, e.g., type systems or model checking) [1,33]. Clearly, our ap-
proach has applications to dynamic HBAC. It is noteworthy to mention that
many ad-hoc optimizations in dynamic HBAC (e.g., history summaries relative
to a policy in the system of Edjlali [9]) are captured in a general and optimal
way by using the automata-based algorithm, and exploiting the nite-automata
minimization-theorem. Thus in the automata based algorithm, one gets \for
free,"optimizations that would otherwise have to be discovered manually.
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Figure 1: An event structure modelling the buyer's observations in the eBay






































Figure 2: Example xml quantied HBAC policy.
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